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C. FREHNER, (l/b, a MOUNTAIN GARDENS, and LEON C.
FREHNER,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
MARGARET _MORTON, D. A.
SKEEN, BERTHA K. SKEEN
and PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL
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'
\
\,;
'

,'

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATE~1:ENT

1

OF NATURE OF THE CASE

The Appellants, D. A. Skeen, Bertha K. Skeen,
and Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association,
a Corporation, appeal from a jury verdict and judgment
on the verdict entered therein, on the foreclosure of a
mechanic's lien on real property pursuant to the pro-
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v1s1ons of Section 38-1-3, and Section 38-1-18 as
amended, U.C.A. 1953, which verdict and judgment on
the verdict was in favor of the Plaintiffs and against
the Defendants.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and
judgment on the verdict in favor of the Respondents
and the denial of the Appellants' motion to have verdict
and judgment set aside and to have judgment entered
in accordance with Defendants' motion for directed
verdict and motion for a new trial, Defendants appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek a reversal of the verdict and judgment of the verdict, or new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to November 25, 1964, the Defendants and
Appellants, D. A. Skeen and Bertha K. Skeen, pur·
chased a piece of real property in Summit Park, Sum·
mit County, Utah, described as Lot 48, Summit Park,
Plat "C" and executed and delivered to the Defendant
and Appellant, Prudential Federal Savings & Loan
Association, a Corporation, a deed of trust on said prop·
erty which was recorded in Summit County, Utah, on
or about the 30th day of November, 1964.
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That upon the purchase of said property, the Defendants and Appellants, D. A. Skeen and Bertha K.
Skeen, built a house on said property and permitted their
daughter, Margaret l.Vlorton, to live in said property,
provided she paid the monthly payments as provided by
the trust deed with the Defendants and Appellants,
Prudential l<-.ederal Savings & Loan Association.
While said daughter was living in said property
she apparently, but unknown to Defendants and Appellants, D. A. Skeen and Bertha K. Skeen, employed
Plaintiffs and Respondents to do some landscape gardening on said premises, consisting of sodding a very
small lawn not to exceed twenty-five feet long and
tapering to eight feet wide (Tr. 58) , with a small basin
at one end containing water which was to be pumped
some six feet high (Tr. 60) on the side of the mountain
and returned by a small water fall to this basin, which
was approximately four to six feet long and three feet
wide, and in addition to this to clear some of the land
of bushes and trees and vines. This work was apparently
performed by Plaintiffs and Respondents between August and December, 1964. At no time did Plaintiffs and
Respondents consult with or approach Defendants and
Appellants with relation to this work and if an agreement was ever entered into for these services it was done
with Margaret Morton (Tr. 6, 7, 9-10). The only time
Appellants were ever notified by Respondents that this
work had been done, was when Respondent, Leon
Frelmer, approached Appellant, Skeen, on or about
February 8, 1965, and advised Skeen that the bill for
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his services had not been paid (Tr. 42-43). It was then
that Respondent, Leon Frelmer, learned that Mr. Skeen
was the owner of the property in question (Tr. 44-45).
Appellant, Skeen, then refused to pay Respondents
(Tr. 46). Pursuant thereto, Appellants then proceeded
to and did file a mechanic's lien on the property in question ( Tr. 4 7) and then filed this action to foreclose this
lien. After the commencement of this action, the Defendant, Margaret lVIorton, was killed in an accident,
and the Appellants, at a pre-trial conference, had a
discussion with relation to a substitution by way of an
Administrator to be appointed for the estate of Margaret Morton, and Appellants not deciding on such,
the court dismissed the action against Margaret Morton
(R. 18).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS PRETRIAL ORDER, OVER THE OBJECTIONS
OF APPELLANTS THAT THE PROPERTY
IN QUESTION WAS SUBJECT TO LIEN
RIGHTS FOR MATERIAL FURNISHED
AND 'VORK AND SERVICES PERFORMED
BY RESPONDENTS UPON SAID PROPERTY.
Section 38-1-3, U.C.A. 1953, provides as follows:
"Contractors, subcontractors and a.ii persons
performing labor upon or furnishing materials
4

to be used in, the construction or alteration of,
or addition to, or repair of, any building, structure or improvement upon land - - - - - shall
have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed
labor or furnished material, for the value of the
services rendered, labor performed or material
furnished by each respectively, whether at the
instance of the owner or of any other person
acting by his authority as agent, contractor or
otherwise.''
Appellants in their answer denied that the Respondents had any lien rights on the property in question,
due to the type of work and services performed. The
court in its pre-trial order (R. 21) over the objections
of the Appellants and on motion to dismiss the complaint
of the Plaintiffs on the question of having lien rights on
said property, overruled said objections and denied the
motion of Defendants and Appellants, which the Appellants and Defendants contend is error and the court
should have granted the motion and sustained the objections of the Appellants and Defendants to dismiss
the complaint of the Respondents and Plaintiffs, with
relation to their purported action on the foreclosure of
a lien, and in support of this contention, Appellants
submit the following:

Does the work performed by Resvondents come
within the JY[ eclwnic's Lien Strdute of the State of Utah?
The work performed by Plaintiffs consisted of the
<'onstruction of a small cement pool, and waterfall, some
top soil, sodding a small lawn, cleaning yard, hauling
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trash, cutting logs for firewood, etc. (Tr. 58-59-60)
(Exhibit 8) .
The law in the State of Utah is not clear as we hare
been able to find, but we are of the opinion, that if' the
work performed by Respondents comes within the
statute at all, it must come within the "improvement"
clause of the Statute.
Timber Structures Inc. v. C. W. S. Grinding

& Machine Works, 229 P.2d 623, at 629 Oregon.

"We agree with Defendant that the right to a
lien is purely statutory, and a claimant to such a
lien, must in the first instance bring himself
clearly within the terms of the Statute. The
Statute is strictly construed as to persons entitled
to its benefits and as to the procedure necessary
to perfect the line, but when the claimant's right
has been clearly established, the law will be liber·
ally interpreted toward accomplishing the pur·
posses of its enactment.
Drake Lumber Co. v. Linquist, 170 P.2d 712;
Phillips v. Graves, 9 P.2d 490, 83 A.L.R. l."
36 Am. State Reports, 85 (Tennessee).
"The claimant must make it clearly to appear
that he has a lien. This lien is purely statutory
and unknown to common law. Only those enum·
erated and embraced in the statute are entitled
to it. A liberal construction of the mechanic's
lien law does not mean that they shall be liberally
construed in enlarging or including others than
those enumerated in the Statute. No one is en·
titled to a lien unless the statute includes him or
them. They are not to be included by strained
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construction. Unless the Statute gives the lien
the party has none."
Howe v. Myers, 162 Pac. 1000, Washington.
"It is well settled that liens of this character
are in derogation of the common law. They depend for their existence solely on the Statutes,
and the courts refuse to extend their operation
for the benefit of those who <lo not come clearly
within the terms of the Statute."

76 A. State Reports, 650.
"A statute giving a lien upon land upon which
a home has been constructed, built or repaired or
fixtures or machinery furnished or erected or improvements made by special contract refers to
things constructed upon the land, such as buildings, machines, fixtures and structures and not to
the enriching of the soil and beautifying the
grounds by planting flowers, shrubs, and trees
and by grading and graveling the grounds and
walks."
36 Am. J ur., Page .55, Paragraph 66.

"It has been held that a lien on building lots
for grading is authorized by a statute giving a
lien to any person who shall perform labor or
services in altering or repairing any building or
building lot. But where the labor and material
for which a lien is claimed are not shown to have
born any relation to the construction, alteration,
or repai~ of any structure upon the land, the rule
would seem to be otherwise. Such statutes are not
to be construed as authori.ziny a lien for improvements or operations upon the soil merely, which
do not enter into or contribute to the erection,
alteration or repair of any building or structure
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upon the land and which are wholly unconnected
with the creation of or work upon such artificial
structures. Coene v. Staub, 36 N.W. 877; Pratt
v. Duncan, 32 N.,iV. 709, Iowa; Howe v. Meyers,
162 P. 1000, Washington. Similarly it has been
held that merely enriching the soil and beautifying the ground, and grading and graveling the
grounds and walks, are not within the words,
'improvements made,' where the same section of
the statute uses the expression, 'building contemplated in this section'; nor is such work deemed to
be within the term, 'Appurtenance'."
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY, ESPECIALLY IN
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 9-A, 9-B, AND 9-C.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GIVE TO THE JURY APPELLANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. l AND 6,
AND APPELLANTS' REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF INTERROGATORY.
It is the contention of the Appellants, in their
defense of this case, that there existed no agency between
Margaret Morton and Appellants authorizing her to
employ Respondents to do the work on the subject
property owned by these Appellants. That the work
performed by Respondents was not known to the Appellants until sometime after the work was performed. That
no contract was ever entered into or authorized by Ap·
pellants and Respondents for the performance of these
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services. That the Respondents did not know, or investigate who owned the property until sometime after the
services were performed and the material furnished
('fr. 70). That at no time did the Appellants ever
ratify or consent to the performance of these services
and furnishing of material, and because of these facts
the property in question never became subject to lien
rights of the Respondents, if any they had. That at no
time did Margaret Morton own any interest in this
property, that she contemplated buying it from her
father, Mr. Skeen, but had not entered into any contract
to that end.
There was some testimony that was introduced on
the part of the Contractor who constructed the house
on the property, that he informed :Mr. Skeen that .Mr.
Frehner was on the property (Tr. 137-138), but it is
the contention of Appellant that this would not bind
Appellants, or estop Appellants from disclaiming any
liability for the performance of these services or furnishing material, and in connection with this we submit the
following:
Morrow v. Merritt, 16 Utah 412, 52 Pac. 667
( 1898).
The owner of certain real estate leased the same to
another who promised to make permanent improvements
thereof. Plaintiff builder sue to impose a :Mechanic's
Lien against the lessor's interest for materials and labor
furnished in making the improvements. The trial court
imposed a lien; the Supreme Court reversed, holding
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that a mechanic's lien could not attach to the Lessor's
interest in the absence of a principal-agent relationship.
The knowledge and acquiescence of the owner did not
estop him from showing that he had made no contract
with the claimant, neither did it constitute a ratification
of the Lessee's contract.
The statute then in effect is found in Laws of Utah
( 1894), Ch. XLI, p. 44. It is almost verbatim with our
present statute; I find no substantial difference. Zane,
J., pointed out that some states have statutes which
would allow a lien to attach to the reversioner's interest
by mere consent; he distinguished our statute:
"Under this law the lien exists upon the interest of the reversioner when the materials are
furnished at his request, or upon the request of
his agent or contractor. The request of the tenant
is not sufficient, though he has bound himself
to make improvements." (At 668.)
This language favors Appellants in the instant case,
for they made no request, for work or materials from
Respondents, nor did their agent or contractor.
Morrison v. Clark, 20 Utah 432, 59 Pac. 235
(1899).

In this ~ase the defendant wife owned real estate
in her own name. Her husband hired plaintiff to per·
form work and furnish material for the construction of
a dwelling upon the property. The wife knew that her
husband had signed a written contract with plaintiff, she
lived on the land and knew that the plaintiff was working
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thereon, she did not prevent the erection of the building,
but she never consented that her land should be liable
under the contract. The trial court found for the plaintiff and imposed a lien; the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the husband had no power to bind the land
of his wife:
"While she knew of the contract, lived on the
land, and did not prevent the erection of the building, she never consented to it, but on the contrary, objected to it, protested against it (to her
husband), and never in any way gave her consent
to it. She concealed nothing, and consented to
nothing that was done, but objected to everything that was done (to her husband). - Under
such circumstances, no power resides in the husband, as such, to bind the land of his wife."
Her knowledge and occupation of the land did not
change the rule.
Belnap v. Condon, 34 Utah 213, 97 Pac. lll
(1903).
The court reaffirmed its position. Here defendant,
vendor of certain realty, sold the land under a contract.
The vendee was supposed to make payments and construct a house on the land. He did not make any payments, although he did pay interest; he constructed a
building on the property and became indebted to plaintiff for materials. Plaintiff brought this action to foreclose a lien against the real estate. The trial court denied
the lien and the Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Frick
quoted with approval the following language from
Morrow v. l\ilerritt (supra) :
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"Doubtless statutes of other states mav be
found giving a lien upon the interest of the l~ssor
of land without a contract with him or his agellt,
when materials or labor is furnished to the tenant
and employed with his consent in erecting buil<l-'
ings or making improvements on the land. But,
as we have seen, the Utah Statute ... requires
the materials to be furnished or the services to be
rendered upon the request of the owner of the
land, or his agent, before the lien can arise upon
his interest."
Justice Frick then added:
"Nor do we think that mere permission by the
vendor to the vendee to make improvements
would be sufficient, and certainly mere knowledge
or acquiescence on the part of the owuer, is not
sufficient under the statute." ( 114.)
Burton ';\Talker Lumber Co. v. Howard, 92 Utah
92, 66 P.2d 134 ( 1937).
This case involved a complicated fact situation in
which the vendee of realty had plaintiff build upon the
property. The court reaffirmed that the vendor's interest could not in any case be subjected to the lien.
In the recent case of Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos,
6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 517 (1957), plaintiff brought
suit against both Lessor and Lessee for the value of
materials used in improving a building. Judge Van Cott
entered a judgment foreclosing a mechanic's lien against
the leasehold interest only. The Lessee appealed. The
Supreme Court, per Crockett, .f ., affirmed, holding that
a lessee is an "owner" within the meaning of the me-
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chanic's lien statute and that his interest is subject to a
lien for the value of improvements contracted for by
him. This would strongly indicate, in Appellant's opinion, that Respondents should have dismissed this action
against Appellants D. A. Skeen and Bertha K. Skeen,
leaving the Respondents to look to the person with
whom they contracted or her interest in the realty for
security.
The foregoing cases show that, though the Supreme
Court pays lip service to the "rule" that ratification or
estoppel could apply, it is not prone to allow these doctrines in actual cases. In most of these cases, even though
the owner of realty benefited as a result of the claimant's labor and improvements and had knowledge
that the work was being done, the lien statute was
held inapplicable against him. It would appear that in
actual practice, the Supreme Court treats our statute as
of the "contract" type whereunder a prior contract with
the landowner is a prerequisite to doing work protected
by the Statute.
The statute itself does not read like a "consent"
statute. It insists upon a contract, express or implied,
with the owner; further, it is clear that the labor or
materials must be furnished at the instance of the owner,
his agent or contractor. This infers that the owner's
request must precede the furnishing.
Appellants' contend that the correct view would be
to insist upon a contract in the first place, followed by
the performing of labor or furnishing of material which
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would effect the lien. See Thompson Real Property
(4th ed., 1957) § 5189, at 285 (citing cases from
Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Maine, Massachusetts, l\'1ichigan, Minnesota, .Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 'Visconsin and West Virginia) .
The foregoing is the position taken by the Colorado
Supreme Court. Mellor v. Valentine, 3 Colorado 225
( 1877). The court in this case reversed the lower court's
imposition of a lien in the following language:
"This in no wise dispenses with the necessity
of showing a previous hiring, or contract with
the owner or his agent under which the work was
continuously done or material continuously furnished. That the contract should be with the owner
or agent is essential. The law imposes upon mechanics, like other persons, the necessity to ascertain for themselves the nature of the interest in
the land to be improved, of the persons ·with whom
they contract, and all negligence in this regard
is charged to their account."
The compiler of the Utah Code lists the follo-wing
under the footnotes on original history of the act:
"The mechanic's lien law of this state was taken
from Colorado, together with the construction
placed thereon by the Colorado courts."
This Mellor case was decided under the Colorado
Statute before Utah adopted it; its rule that there be a
contract with the owner preceding the beginning of work
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should therefore be good law in the State of Utah at
present.
The statute provides for liens by "Contractors" and
"Sub-Contractors." Since plaintiffs have no contract,
express or implied, with the owner, they cannot be contractors. Since they were not hired by the contractor
(evidence shows that contractor disliked and distrusted
him (Tr. 246), he was not a subcontractor. Section
38-1-3 provides for a lien by "all other persons" but this
is substantially qualified by "shall have a lien" ... for
the value of the services ... whether at the instance of
the owner or any other person acting by his authority
as agent, contractor or otherwise." Plaintiffs did not act
at the instance of the owner, his agent, or his contractor;
he acted at the instance of a tenant, a licensee, or at most
a vendee. A contract with a non-owner does not suffice
to bind the owner. E.g., Lierz v. Cook, 435 Colo. 221,
315 P.2d 535 (1957) (contract with licensee; lessor protected even though he had not filed notice of non-liability as required by Colorado Statute). Bunt v. Roberts, 76 Idaho 158, 299 P2d 629 ( 1955) (contract with
licensee); Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Bickel, 80
Idaho 312, 245 Pac. 92 ( 1926) (contract with optionee) ;
Morrison v. Clark, supra (Utah) (contract with spouse
of owner); and Belnap v. Condon, supra, (Utah) (contract with vendor) .
The rule of refusing to bind the owner's interest by a
contract with a non-owner is sound; otherwise there
could be no security in property ownership for ambi-
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tious builders would forc>'er be building under contracts
with non-owners and then forcing a sale of the land for
their price.

If the court holds that the Utah lien statute is of
the "contract" type, there could be no lien imposed b>'
estoppel or ratification, for to have a lien the contract
would have to precede the beginning of the work. Even
if a lien could be imposed by ratification or estoppel, it
is the contention of Appellants that the evidence does
not show the existence of either in this case.
Ratification is defined as "confirmation after the
act with full knowledge." Homes v. Hrobon, ________ Ohio
... , 103 N .E. 2d 845, 869 ( 1951).
The evidence shows that defendants, the Skeens,
did not possess full knowledge; they were unable to
visit the premises ('Tr. 112, 113, 115, 241, 24.lA), di<l
not know the costs, etc. Therefore, they could not ratify.
As noted above, the Utah Supreme Court has not yet
found a contract ratified sufficiently to support a mechanic's lien; in Belnap v. Condor, 34 Utah 213, 97
Pac. 111, the owner knew that the work was being done,
was desirous of having it done, acquiesced without objection, and accepted the benefits therefrom, yet this was
not a ratification. This seems to be the majority rule;
mere inactive consent is insufficient in the absence of
fraud. E.g., Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Bickel, supra;
Snelling v. 'Vortman, 107 Ind. App. "1122, 24 N.E. 2d
791 (1940).
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As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court, the reputed
owner of property has no right to do anything which
would give a lien on the premises. Further, the true
owner's permission or knowledge of the improving is
insufficient to authorize a lien thereon. Parker v. Northwestern Investment Co., ________ Idaho ________ , 225 Pac. 307
(1927).

If theories of estoppel or ratification would support
a lien, Respondents would have to show that Appellants
had ratified or had so acted to be estopped. As noted
above, it is necessary that one have full knowledge of all
operative facts in order to ratify; not knowing Respondents' price or what they were doing would seem to bar
a ratification.
The Utah Supreme Court defines estoppel thusly:
" 'Equitable estoppel' or 'estoppel in pais' is
the principle by which a party who knows or
should know the truth is absolutely precluded,
both at law and in equity, from denying or asserting the contrary of any material fact, which, by
his words or conduct, affirmative or negative,
intentionally or through· culpable negligence, he
has induced another, who was excusably ignorant
of the true facts and who had a right to rely on
such words and conduct, to believe and act on
them thereby, as a consequence reasonably to be
anticipated, changing his position in such a way
that he would suffer injury if such denial or contrary assertion were followed." l\!Iigliaccio v.
Davis, 120 Utah 1, 232 P.2d 198 (1951).
The facts of the instance case do not fit into this
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definition. The Appellants did not induce the Respondents through their acts or conduct to rely on them or
on the land itself for payment of the debt. Respondents
had actual notice of Appellants' lack of confidence in
his abilities (Tr. 248) through prior dealings for ·which
Respondent Frelmer was not paid.
Further Respondents were not excusably ignorant of the fact that the fee title ·was in Appellants. The
deed showing this ·was filed in the proper place putting
Respondents on constructive notice of the true oYmership. See, e.g., Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Bicknel,
supra; Royal Lmnber Co. v. Haelzner, ________ Iowa ________ ,
201 N.W. 53 (1924).

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING APPELLANTS' l\IOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AT THE CONCLUSIOX
OF RESPONDENTS' CASE.
In view of the foregoing authorities, it is the eontention of the Appellants that the court erred in not
submitting the facts of this case to the jury, and directing the jury to return a verdict in favor of Respondents
and against the Appellants as contained in Instructions
Nos. 9-A and 9-B (R. 65).
The court of its own volition and ignoring the
petition of Appellants, decided that the land Ill
question was subject to a lien; that there was an
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agency existing between Margaret ::Morton and Appellants and that the Appellants knew of the work going
on and are estopped from denying these facts. These
are facts which should have been submitted to the jury
instead of the court deciding same.
At the conclusion of the Respondents' case, the only
evidence introduced by the Respondents that could apply
to an estoppel was the testimony of the witness Brewer
(Tr. 138-139) as follows:
"Q. Did you talk to Mr. Skeen about Mr.
Frehner being up there and making these improvements?

A. Yes, I must have told him. He was up
there, yes.
Q. About when you would have known he was
up there, and told Mr. Skeen about it?

A. Well, I presume the time, approximately,
he started the job."
In view of the decisions in Morrow v. Merritt, 16
Utah 412, 52 Pac. 557, supra, even if .Mr. Skeen had
some information about Frehner being on the place
would not amount to an estoppel. To the same effect
is the case of Morrison v. Clark, 20 Utah 432, 59 Pac.
235, supra, Belnap v. Condon, 34 Utah 213, 87 Pac. lll,
supra, and other cases cited above. These cases hold that
mere knowledge of the owner that some work is being
done on his property would not amount to incurring
a liability on the part of the owner nor subject the property to a foreclosure of any lien rights.
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There is evidence that l\Ir. Skeen consented that
his daughter, .Margaret Morton, could go ahead with
the landscaping (Tr. 247-248), but advised her not to
employ Frehner. .Mr. Skeen testified as follows (Tr.
245,246,248):

"Q. '-\Then, if any time, did you learn anything about this landscape gardening - the subject of this law suit - the gardening on these
premises?

A. Well, when they was getting out the plans,
she said, 'I have been told that Frehner does good
work, do you know him?'
I said 'Yes, I had a very unfortunate experience with him one time, and I would a(hise you
to seek another architect if you need one. · ' "
Again (Tr. 248) :
"Q. Who made the arrangement for the employment of l\fr. Frehner?

A. lVIargaret, :Margaret as I have told you.
I said, 'I don't - I have had an unpleasantness
with him, and I would prefer you not do it.' "
Again (Tr. 252):
"Q. Now at any time in your conversation
with Margaret about this matter, did you ever
say anything or give her any permission to go
ahead with this work?

A. Absolutely not."
Again (Tr. 259), Cross .Examination:
"Q. So you were advised. in that conversation
at least, it 'ms Frehner, and that he was going
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to perhaps charge you more than would be reasonable in Mr. Brewer's eyes?
A. Charge it to Margaret. I had nothing to
do with employing him. No contract. I had no
knowledge what he was doing."

CONCLUSION
The evidence discloses that D. A. Skeen and Bertha
Skeen, Appellants, are the owners of the property in
question at all times mentioned.
They placed their daughter Margaret .Morton in
possession of the premises for the purposes of living
there, provided she paid the monthly payments on the
property with some understanding that if she later
wanted to buy the property some arrangements could
be made to that end. She was, at most, a renter or a
tenant at will.
The only person the Frehners contacted with relation to their work on this property was Margaret Morton, a renter or tenant at will. At no time did the Frehners contact the owners. In fact they did not know who
was the owner of the property until along in February
1965, when they learned that the Skeens owned the property. They looked to Margaret Morton at all times
with relation to payment. As an afterthought, when they
could not get their money out of Margaret Morton
they contacted Mr. Skeen and demanded payment from
him, who refused to pay.
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The deed to the property was on record in the
Recorder's Office of Summit County at all times after
the property was acquired and before the Frehners commenced work on this property. The law imposes the
obligation on the lien claimant to ascertain the owner of
the property he is working on as decided in lVlellor v.
Valentine, supra. No such inquiry was made by Respondents.
vVhile there is evidence that Mr. Skeen consented
to his daughter doing some landscaping on this property, there was no authorization. A mere consent or permission is not sufficient to bind the owner as decided in
Morrow v. Merritt, supra.
The evidence discloses that the Skeens never went
on the property during the time the Frehners were performing services thereon. There was no estoppel
according to the definition of an estoppel as cited herein. '
There was no contract with the owner, either actual
or implied.

It is very questionable as to the services performed
and the material supplied that they were of the kind
that would subject this property to lien rights.
The ·court was in error in directing the jury to
find in favor of Respondents for the above reasons.
\Ve respectfully request of the court to analyze
the decisions and the reasons of the cases and the law
with relation to lien rights as the Appellants have
respectfully submitted hereinabove.
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In view of the foregoing we contend that the verdict
and judgment on the verdict in this case be reversed and
set aside, or grant a new trial to Appellants.
Respectfully submitted,
BENJAMIN SPENCE

Attorney for Appellants
1301 Walker Bank Bldg.

Salt Lake City, Utah
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